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MARKET EXPANSION OR MARGIN EROSION:
THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF
DIGITAL CONVERGENCE
Ravi Mantena








Digital convergence enables firms in the computing, communications, and electronic consumer industries to
design and launch multifunctional converged products. This presents firms with a significant opportunity for
value creation and profit growth. At the same time, the increased substitutability between products supplied
by different industry segments heightens competition and poses a significant threat of margin erosion. These
conflicting incentives make it difficult for firms in converging industries to make strategic product line and
product design decisions. 
In our study, we analyze the technological, product, and market factors that have an impact on these decisions
and derive conditions under which it is (and is not) optimal for firms to launch converged products that
combine the functionalities of products in two different industries. We find that the optimality of including
converged products in the product line depends crucially on the synergies arising out of functionality
colocation. Further, as technology permits higher levels of product convergence, converged products relegate
specialized products to narrow market niches, even when there is some quality degradation from functionality
colocation. Overall production and total firm profits tend to increase, although the impact on consumer surplus
and total welfare is ambiguous.
1 INTRODUCTION
The term digital convergence has been used in the academic and trade literature to refer to a number of distinct, yet related,
phenomena. Its most common use has been to describe the coming together of the computing, communications, and entertainment
industries, driven by the union of audio, video, and data communications at the content or distribution levels. In a slightly different
sense, the term has also been used to describe the tighter and relatively seamless integration of information across different media,1
as well as the increasing connectivity between different electronic appliances in the home or office.  
To define the term more precisely, one needs to separate the salient aspects of convergence. First, underlying the phenomenon
is the technology driver:  the growing incorporation of common digital or semiconductor technologies in the products of several
distinct industries.  We refer to this as digital convergence. Second, this convergence at the technology level creates increasing
overlap in the functionality provided by products and service offerings in these industry segments, such as PDAs and cellular
phones, cable TV connections and telephone lines, video game consoles and DVD players, or switches and routers. We refer to
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2The term convergence has further been used to refer to the attempts by firms in the affected industries to react to the technological and market
transformation by acquiring complementary resources and capabilities through mergers, acquisitions, alliances, and technology partnerships
(Deise et al. 2000; Yoffie 1997). Such responses aimed at coping with the business effect (product convergence) driven by the technology cause
(digital convergence) can be referred to as industry convergence.
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this as product convergence.  This disentangles the IT cause (digital convergence) from the business effect (product
convergence).2
Product convergence is increasingly commonplace in the computing, communications, and consumer electronics industries. PDAs
such as RIMs Blackberry 5810 and Handsprings Treo now incorporate cellular telephone functionality with quality levels near
those of high-end dedicated handsets. The modern PC itself is the result of the convergence of a large number of distinct
functionalities. If the impending launch of a home media center by Digeo (which recently acquired Moxi Media), or of similar
products from Microsoft and Sony are successful, one may see a non-PC-centric convergence of the consumer communications
functionalities. 
These examples illustrate that digital convergence enables firms to make their specialized devices more general-purpose, through
the addition of functionalities provided by products in other distinct product markets. However, the promise of digital convergence
is accompanied by a significant threat of profit erosion.  Product convergence undermines the tradeoffs between the attributes of
distinct product lines, essential for creating product differentiation strategies, and can thereby wipe out secure market niches. The
result is increased substitutability between products, even those traditionally considered members of different product markets,
and this in turn makes industry boundaries more permeable (Yoffie 1997).
Consequently, firms face crucial product design trade-offs. Do they extend the functionality and scope of their specialized
products, trading off increased competition and potential performance degradation for increased customer wallet share?  If so,
how should they design and price this broader technology product line? There are currently no clear guidelines about the nature
of the central trade-off that governs this decision between potential gains from market expansion and the inevitable profit margin
erosion from increased competition and substitutability.  Our research attempts to shed light on these questions.  Specifically, we
ask: 
 What is the effect of the potential introduction of multifunctional converged products on optimal product lines and
designs, customer consumption patterns, profitability, and welfare? 
 What are the technological, competitive, and product-related factors that affect these outcomes? 
2 OVERVIEW OF MODEL
Our model consists of two overlapping product markets, each of which provides consumers with a set of distinct product
functionalities.  There is one firm in each market. Each firm may choose to offer a specialized product, which fulfils functionality
needs in its own market; a converged product, which combines the functionality of its own market with (partial) functionality of
the other market; or both products.  The demand side is modeled using the representative consumer approach (Dixit and Stiglitz
1977) with a concave utility function that is separable in the numeraire Y. While we have some results for a generic concave utility
function, most of our analysis employs a more specific quadratic form:
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Maximizing utility for the representative consumer yields a linear downward-sloping demand function for each of the three
products. The key parameters in this demand system are described briefly below.
 The level of demand substitutability/complementarity between the markets 8. , (-1,1) : This parameter represents the
underlying economic relationship between demand in the markets prior to digital convergence, and determines the cross-
elasticity of substitution between the two specialized products (as explained in Table 1).  Some services such as high-speed
Internet access and cable TV are natural substitutes, since demand for both is partially driven by a consumers entertainment
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needs (8 > 0). On the other hand, demand for cellular telephones and PDAs may be complementary, since both increase with
an increase in the level of mobile work (8 < 0).  The demand for cable TV and wireline telephony is likely to be largely
independent (8 = 0). 
 The relative revenue potential "1,  "2  , (0,%): The incentive to introduce multifunctional converged products depends on the
potential for profits in each market. Firms in saturated industries often look beyond their industry boundaries to find market
segments that offer better growth opportunities. Product convergence presents such firms with the opportunity to enter these
market segments. For example, relatively slow growth in traditional wireline voice services gives telecommunications firms
strong incentives to provide broadband Internet connectivity, enabling them to leverage their last-mile ownership in a
market with a higher growth potential. Conversely, for firms that are already in large and fast growing segments, the
incentives to move into smaller or slowing markets are lower. 
 The level of technological synergy between colocated functionalities s , (0,%): For certain functionalities, a hybrid device
that combines these functionalities is intrinsically more valuable.  For instance, combining cellular telephony and personal
organization facilitates one-tap calling, a single synchronized address book (cutting out redundant data entry), and a single
device to carry around (s > 1). However, the device may be more bulky, and resource competition may reduce the
performance or battery life of the device (s < 1). Combining the functionality of routing and switching into a single device
increases performance to near wire-speeds; however, it may reduce overall quality due to the reliance on fewer pieces of
highly complex equipment. This parameter influences the induced revenue potential of converged products, as illustrated in
Table 1. 
 The level of the competing functionality in the converged product r , (0,1]: The extent of the functionality that can be
incorporated into a converged product may be limited by the current state of digital technology. Even where technological
constraints are not binding, firms may choose to limit the extent or quality level to which the second functionality is provided.
We sometimes also refer to r as the extent of convergence. This parameter influences both the revenue potential of the
converged products, as well as the cross-elasticity of substitution between the specialized and the converged products.  
Product 1 and product 2 are the specialized products, and product 3 is the converged product created by adding functionality 2
to specialized product 1.  Firm A produces products 1 and 3, while Firm B produces product 2. Table 1 summarizes the remaining
specifics of the model.
Table 1.  Summary of Remaining Model Variables 
Variable and description Formula 
812: Slope of price for product 1 (product 2) in quantity of product 2 (product 1) 812 = 8
813: Slope of price for product 1 (product 3) in quantity of product 3 (product 1) 813 = 1 + 8r        1 + r
823: Slope of price for product 2 (product 3) in quantity of product 3 (product 2) 823 =  8 + r         1 + r
"3: Revenue potential for converged product 3 "3 = s("1 + r"2)
k: Relative revenue potential of the two specialized products k = "2 / "l
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3 ANALYSIS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
In the first phase of our study, we have analyzed the product portfolio choices of firms under an asymmetric technology regime.
We assume that the technologies required to design and produce converged products are available in only one of the industries.
Consequently, only one of the two firms can introduce a converged product in addition to its specialized product, while the second
firm supplies only a single specialized product. We term this the asymmetric convergence game. 
Game structure and equilibrium: The underlying economic model of competition is based on the static multiproduct Cournot
game of perfect information. Firms simultaneously choose their product lines and the corresponding quantities, given a level of
convergence r. A two-stage game where the extent of convergence r is a symmetric choice variable in the first stage of the game
is currently work in progress. 
Proposition: A unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies always exists for the asymmetric convergence game
with linear demand.
Sketch of proof: A pure strategy equilibrium exists since the strategy spaces are convex and compact, and the payoff functions
are continuous over the entire strategy space while also being concave in their respective strategy spaces (Fudenberg and Tirole
1991). Uniqueness of the equilibrium is established via a graphical analysis of the best-response functions:  it is shown that for
all points in the parameter space, the best response plane of Firm A (that is, the optimal (q1,q3) as a function of q2) intersects the
best-response curve of Firm Bthe optimal q2 as a function of (q1,q3)at exactly one feasible point.
Optimal product portfolios:  First order conditions along with non-negativity constraints on quantities yield the following result:
for any generic downward sloping demand system, Firm A will always supply both the converged as well as the specialized
product, as long as these two products are complementary, that is, so long as 813 < 0.  The outcomes are less straightforward when
the specialized and converged products are demand substitutes. Since the equilibrium is tractable and unique for the quadratic
form of equation (1), optimal product-line choices for the firms under different parameter values can be derived. 
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal product portfolios for Firm A under this scenario (Firm B sells only a specialized product in the
asymmetric convergence game).  When s < 1, the converged product is not produced for a large set of parameter values. This is
more so when the extent of convergence is low (the lower portion of the figure, where r is low). Supply of the converged product
becomes optimal when the extent of convergence is high, but even then, the specialized product will continue to be supplied,
unless products 1 and 2 are very close substitutes.
In stark contrast, when s > 1, it is never optimal for Firm A to produce only the specialized product. Over a wide range of
parameter values, particularly where the functionalities are substitutes, it is optimal to produce only the converged product and
discontinue the specialized product altogether. When the functionalities are complementary, both products will be supplied.  The
desirability of converged products at equilibrium increases as s increases (synergies from functionality colocation go up) or as
r increases (the degree of product convergence goes up).
Market outcomes:  Figure 2 illustrates typical market outcomes for different degrees of product convergence r. As Figures 2(a)
and 2(d) illustrate, the converged product accounts for a significant share of the market. This market share grows with the extent
of convergence and (independently) increases with the degree of substitutability between the base functionalities (not shown in
Figure 2), thus relegating specialized products to narrow market niches. The competitive effects of the converged product force
price and quantity reductions for the specialized products, as shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b).  This naturally depresses Firm Bs
profits significantly.  While Firm A loses profits from cannibalization, market expansion from the converged product more than
compensates, as shown in Figure 2(c). 
From a welfare perspective, the total quantity consumed (of all three products together) in the marketplace is higher than in the
absence of converged products, as are total firm profits. Furthermore, total industry quantity and profit go up as the level of
product convergence increases.
4 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS
The preceding analysis indicates that digital convergence can significantly alter the competitive landscape for firms. The poten-
tially disruptive nature of convergence has already been observed in the workplace-computing environment, where the function-
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r = 1
Optimal product line 
includes both specialized 
and converged product 
k = 1 and s < 1
r = 0
Optimal product line 
consists of only 
converged product 
Optimal product line consists of 
only specialized product 
λ = 0 λ = 1λ = -1
r = 1
Optimal product line 
includes both specialized 
and converged product 
k = 1 and s > 1
r = 0
λ = 0 λ = 1
Optimal product line consists 
of only converged product 
λ = -1
Figure 1(a):  Optimal product lines with a  loss in value from functionality colocation (s < 1)
Figure 1(b).  Optimal product lines with a gain in value from functionality colocation (s > 1)
The figure depicts the parameter space where different portfolio choices are optimal for Firm A (the
firm with the digital convergence technology).  The horizontal axes range from purely complementary
functionalities (8 = -1) to purely substitutable ones (8 = 1).  The vertical axis measures extent of
convergence, ranging from no convergence (r = 0) to complete convergence (r = 1).  In both figures,
relative market size k = 1 (the markets have equal revenue potential).
Figure 1.  Optimal Product Portfolios for Firm A
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Figure 2(d).  Share of Revenue from Product 3
The figure depicts quantities, prices, profits, and market shares of the specialized (product 1 and
product 2) and converged (product 3) products, as the extent of convergence r goes from 0 to 1.  These
specific graphs depict a relative market size of k = 1 and a low level of complementarity between the
base functionalities (8 = -0.25).  At higher levels of convergence, the converged product relegates
specialized products to narrow market niches, and the firm with the converged product (Firm A)
dominates the market.
Figure 2.  Typical Market Outcomes for Different Degrees of Product Convergence r
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ality of a number of specialized desktop office products (such as electronic word processors, and accounting terminals) has been
subsumed into the PC.  Our results are supported by the fact that the next new generation of successful converged products has
appeared in an industry pair that share a high s value:  cellular telephony and PDAs.  These are weakly complementary products
with a significant technological synergy between the underlying personal communication and organization functions and, as
indicated by Figure 1(b), we currently see a significant presence of both specialized and converged products in product lines
across these industries. In the home entertainment industries, as the converged products from Digeo and others mature, our results
also indicate they could relegate the pure-play digital video recorder and cable modem industries to niche markets, which poses
a substantial strategic challenge for firms like TiVo. 
Clearly, these results may change when firms are technologically symmetricwhile spawning valuable products in the
marketplace, it may make it difficult for firms to appropriate this valueor it could cause firms to invest in high-quality
specialized products, symmetrically preserving profit margins. The next phase of this research analyzes the symmetric
convergence game, where both firms can introduce converged products.  We first examine simultaneous choice, and then the case
of a technology lead.  This analysis is at an advanced stage, and a complete set of results will be presented at ICIS.
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